Winning advice for PokerStars ultra-low-buyin play chip sit&go events

A typical example where six players go all in before the very first flop. (Pocket 8s made quads on the turn & river.)

• Do you want to play or do you want to win?
  • Play the nine-handed or ten-handed game?
  • The best strategy is to sit out
• The very first two critical hands
  • Simple advice
    • Pocket aces on the first two hands
    • Pocket kings/queens on the first two hands
    • Big Slick on the first two hands
    • Anything else on the first two hands
  • Complex advice
  • After those fateful first two hands
• Betting patterns
  • Monster stacks at a short table seldom pose a threat
  • Short stacks at a short table seldom pose a threat
  • The button at a short table seldom poses a threat
• Unique to the ULBPC events
  • Don't advertise your bluffs — advertise your weakness!
  • Heads up, all in, "got to go"
  • Those annoying "zzzzzz" speed demons
• Why are there so many bad beats?
  • Bad play breeds bad beats
  • An analysis of some crap shoots
  • Video with (sardonic) commentary for a typical crap shoot
  • Is this hand really a bad beat?
  • YouTube video analysis #1 of poor play
  • Bonus: some amazingly big hands (with one killer bad beat)

The ultimate question — do you want to play or do you want to win?

It's not that these people play poorly — it's that winning is only an afterthought. They really just want to play. They see their entry fees as entertainment, not as an investment.

Play the nine-handed or ten-handed game?

In any ULBPC event, (1) nearly all of your opponents will be fish, (2) ten-handed games last as long as nine-handed games, and (3) you'll nearly always cross the money line before the blinds grow large. Statistically, then, the "310+20" ten-handed game generates slightly more profit than the "300+20" nine-handed game. Enter the "310+20" games to maximize profit over the long run.

If you truly want to push out the limpers behind you on either of the very first two pre-flops, you first need the vigorish and then you need to raise 11-17xBB. Just rea­lize that, more often than not, 1-2 players (espe­cially the SB) will pro­bably call it. This is espe­cially true if they've al­ready called 2xBB.

The best strategy is to sit out

Believe it or not, the single most successful strategy is to sit out. My spreadsheet shows I make an astounding +86% on these entry fees. I often register for two games (the maximum allowed) right before I drive to work and right before I go to bed. I also like to sit out two games whenever I play at a side table. I earn thousands of chips each week and I routinely take second place. Free play money!

Of course, every pro player insists "aggressive poker is winning poker." Yet here in the ULBPC events, "submissive poker is winning poker." Sitting out is a killer strategy! Of course this raises an obvious question: "does PokerStars allow a total sit-out strategy?" The answer is YES. Quoting from their website:

What these players are doing is not against any rule, and no action will be taken against them. For the same reasons, we cannot make changes to the system to discourage this activity. Once a player has paid their entry, they are entitled to play (or not play) every hand that their chips will buy them... If players are actually winning chips by sitting out the entire time, this is a sign that the play in these events is far too loose and you should adjust your play accordingly. You will find that this is often the case with all play money chip games ... [and this is why] we have implemented a limit of 2 concurrent play money sit and go events per player.

	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
Average profit margin	+41.9%	+40.9%	+52.0%	+53.7%	+37.8%	+56.8%	+62.8%
Average finish place	3.18	3.25	3.10	3.12	3.23	3.05	3.02

The very first two hands

Only the rarest of games plays out conservatively from the start. I think very carefully before playing either the very first hand or second hand in any ULBPC event. The very first and/or second hand will routinely unfold in one of four ways:

"I pro­pose a new word for players who go all in pre-flop. 'Slappy.' They are obvi­ously slap-happy." -- Poker­Stars player Rhien "Lermi" Gundlach

1. Most players limp until it gets to the button/blinds. Someone in middle position might make the minimum raise, which will be ignored. "If he had a strong enough hand to raise, he would have raised stronger, and besides, Q6 offsuit is my favorite speculative holding." Usually either the button or the BB pushes all in, perhaps thinking six limpers will fold. "Oooh, he must have a monster." But those who limped will often call. "If my hand is worth 20 chips, it's certainly worth calling a bluff raise. If I win, I'll be the chip leader, and if I lose, it'll only be because he got lucky against me, and hey, there's always the next game." The original all in typically squares off against 2-5 callers with a complete splatter of hands. It literally turns into a crap shoot.

2. A few people limp until someone in middle position pushes all in. A few people fold until it gets across the table, at which point someone calls. One of the blinds may or may not get involved. The overwhelming majority of these people turn over muck — the 1500-chip bet is an outrageous bluff to steal 70-90 chips, the other guy thinks his offsuit Motown is probably the strongest hand at the table that can stand up to a bully, and the blind risks everything to defend his 10-20 chips. It literally turns into a crap shoot.

3. One of the first three players bets 11-17xBB, putting limpers to the only real test that exists during the first two hands of a ULBPC event. It's no longer a simple decision to shoot craps — the opponents must decide if their hand will connect with the flop. More often than not, though, one or more limpers will call, especially the small blind who will risk 21-33 times the amount he could simply walk away from. In some cases an opponent will realize this is an all-in-or-fold decision, and he might just go all in with any two cards. Once that guy goes all in, other players may call (this is a certainty if they've already called your raise). It literally turns into a crap shoot.

4. Most players limp in. The BB makes the minimum raise and five limpers call it. The flop comes with 280 in the pot. (In some cases the BB makes a 5x raise, signaling "I've got a legit hand and I'm making a legit raise, so you better not tangle with me!" and half of the time it will convince one of the first two limpers to fold; everyone else will call.) After the flop or maybe after the turn, the first guy checks because he hopes to trap someone with his top pair. The second guy bets the pot with bottom two pair. He gets raised by a guy with top/bottom pair. They both get raised by a guy with middle trips. Another guy goes all in with a draw to the nut flush. The guy behind him calls with a draw to the third-nut flush. The final guy calls all in because the pot is huge and, hey, you never know what the final two cards might bring. The guy with top pair thinks "there can't possibly be that many top pairs out there, so someone is obviously bluffing" and he calls all in. It literally turns into a crap shoot.

Simple advice for the critical first two hands

Pocket aces on the first two hands

In a perfect scenario, 8-9 people go all in and you fold rockets because it guarantees you'll place in the money!

Given the right situation on the first two pre-flops, you can take the vigorish in early position with a 17xBB raise; push all in from late position if you believe you'll face only 1-2 players; call all in if you sit fully across the table from the opponent and you're the first to call it; or call a 17xBB raise from any position if the betting doesn't look too problematic. Just realize you may find yourself in any number of wrong situations where you'll throw away rockets on the first two pre-flops because you simply couldn't protect them from a school full of fish. "That's poker."

Thankfully, a good all in situation presents itself more often than you might expect in a ULBPC event. In one example, I picked up aces on the button on the first hand (statistically, once every 2,210 games) with five limpers. I figured the guy called "No Bad Plays" was a conservative player and no one else at this table displayed an attitude in their name or picture. You can expect 1-2 callers in this situation, although in a rare case everyone will fold and say "take the 30 chips you button-stealing idiot." In my case, everyone folded to "cstlaw" who sat directly across from me. He called with a suited queen, the rest folded, he busted, and I took the early chip lead.

Fold equity ap­proaches zero on the first two hands and re­mains mini­scule for the rest of the first round.

(But don't let the name "No Bad Plays" fool you. Months later, he would take pocket 5s all the way to the river against three opponents, facing a higher two pair on the board, and betting piddly amounts that proved he doesn't have a clue about pot odds and doesn't want to risk his chips on a bluff against multiple players.)

Pocket kings/queens on the first two hands

Here's a big plus. If you limp with a high pocket pair during the first orbit and you flop quads or a set, then you can be certain your hand is perfectly disguised!

If you just couldn't get away from kings/queens and you end up facing an overpair, take heart. You're only a 4:1 underdog against that particular hand — and in all probability someone else shoved all in with you. Thank your lucky stars if you've got company, because you want those kind of pot odds when you defeat an overpair!

Big Slick on the first two hands

Anything else on the first two hands

Complex advice for the first two hands

In a com­plex scenario, you can reason­ably expect a 35:1 return for any truly specu­la­tive hand.

If you can see a flop in this complex scenario and if you hit it very hard, then you can simply push all in and reasonably expect at least one fish will make the call. If you invest 2xBB and one player goes all in with you, then your investment will yield an expected value of 35:1. From a mathematical perspective, you can play almost any truly speculative hand for 35:1. Oh, sure, I'll still throw away beer hands and other genuine muck, but I'll gladly speculate with a gap suited connector or an offsuit T5.

Just remember! In this complex scenario, you want a 35:1 return on investment for any speculative hand going up against five or more opponents. You'll fail 34 out of 35 times to hit the flop very hard and you need the discipline to fold at the first sign of aggression. If you pay anything less than an all-in to chase another card, it will mathematically cripple your pre-flop expected value — and it will give one of your opponents more expected value for his own speculative hand.

After those fateful first two hands

Betting patterns

It is mathe­ma­ti­cally incor­rect to semi-bluff at a table where fold equity ap­proaches zero.

Most pre-flop raises (after the first two hands) come from someone who presses the "raise" button. It's the minimum raise (2xBB) and it'll come from any position, with any number of limpers, with any number of players yet to act. The player on the button seems to think his position merits a minimum raise, while a non-button player seems to think his hand merits a minimum raise.

Rarely will anyone re-raise on the pre-flop (after the first two hands) after someone hits the raise button. When this happens, it's typically done by someone who hits the raise button — usually a slap at the first person who hit the button Those who do re-raise deserve special attention. If it comes quickly and/or it's either 2x or way over the top, you should suspect he doesn't know how to raise. If the re-raise comes slowly and is in the 3x-4x range, you should suspect he's a solid player betting for value.

Monster stacks at a short table seldom pose a threat

On the other hand, you may find yourself facing an ultra-loose ultra-aggressive player who adores the bluff. In one typical example, it's only the second round of blinds and you're already heads-up against a guy who sees cheap flops first and then make gigantic bluffs. His stack is six times your size, so he should charge you to see every flop — but this guy wants to bluff, not win. The strategy, then, is to give him what he wants until you hit solid values. Then you either flat-call him or bet for value all the way to the river. He won't give you any tough decisions, but you should hesitate repeatedly as if you're making a hard choice. Let him take any number of small pots while you take down the big pots.

It's now the fourth round of blinds and you're the new chip leader. Your opponent simply cannot stop bluffing when you flat-call with solid values. He fires a bluff, you call; he fires a second bluff, you call; he fires a third bluff, you raise, and he calls because he knows you're counter-bluffing with a worse hand than his. In this case, the guy kept losing ground even though he took down a majority of pots. He ended up with second place, but I suspect he enjoyed the many times his bluffs worked. No doubt he soothed himself with the rationalization that I got lucky a couple of times.

Short stacks at a short table seldom pose a threat

The button at a short table seldom poses a threat

Unique to the ULBPC events

Don't advertise your bluffs — advertise your weakness !

If you ever raised in a decisive manner on any hand by this point, you can expect the player(s) in that hand now view you as tight-solid. You don't want that image. Instead of making a move with a bluff, try to make an "inverse move" with a fold-not-check option. You get into a situation — say you checked from the BB with a 23 offsuit — and on the river you have a 0% chance of winning. Instead of checking, you order the software to fold. The player(s) in the hand will assess you as weak and may try to take advantage of you with mediocre holdings. Even better, this "inverse move" can help set up a well-timed bluff! (But don't bluff in an ULBPC event until you know the remaining players will respect you. Even then, you should severely limit your bluffs. The big stacks will sometimes reward your river bet just to satisfy their curiosity.)

Consider folding instead of checking if (1) you called to the river on a draw, (2) two or more opponents will show down, and (3) you've got no pair. Not only does it show weakness, it also prevents the other players from seeing your hole cards.

Okay, now you're on the bubble with muck in the SB and you'd love to spark some aggression among the players. The act of sacrificing your SB after a thoughtful pause — yet another sign of weakness on your part — will sometimes bolster the BB to make a move when he might have just checked. This sacrifice works best when the BB is either the short stack or the chip leader. It also works extraordinarily well on the very first two hands if you find yourself in the SB with limpers. Failing to complete the blind often triggers monstrous aggression from the BB!

I like to set up what I call a "BB/SB/button weakness play" when the game reaches the bubble. The players on either side of me may notice my weakness when I (1) force-fold after the flop in the BB, then (2) fail to complete the SB, then (3) refuse to play on the button. I do it to inspire aggression & greed on the bubble.

Heads up, all in, "got to go"

If you go to the flop with four or more opponents, and you get called to the river, then suddenly face a strong re-raise, you need to ask "what can I beat here?" If you can beat the majority of plausible holdings, then call. If you can't beat the majority of plausible holdings, then fold.

If you keep on folding, he may start announcing his cards — and if he does so, you can be certain he has those cards. I've never encountered a liar in this situation. You might think "that's suicide," but from his perspective the fun is already dead. If I can't call the very first announcement, I'll respond with "Thank you, I'll go with my first good hand" and then I'll fold. My response passively and politely encourages him to keep announcing his cards. (Note: announcing is allowed under PokerStars tournament rule #16 once you reach heads-up.)

Far more often, though, your opponent won't announce his cards. This means you've got three basic options. First, the blinds will still be small, so you can fold until you pick up a comfortable all-in hand. Second, you can fold glacially slow until he sits out. Third ... you can sit out for a short while. (I use this time to check if my opponent is playing at other tables.) If he hangs around to steal your blinds, then you know his "got to go" was a lie. In these situations, I like to return to the game and chide the player for lying. "Got to go, eh?" Then I fold glacially slow on every all in. The game once again is no longer fun for him.

Those annoying "zzzzzz" speed demons

1. You get eight seconds on every betting decision before the alarm buzz.
2. You get 15 seconds on every betting decision before the clock starts.
3. You get a grand total of 60 seconds on your tournament clock.

In some cases a speed demon will grow vulgar or may even threaten violence. If it happens, stop talking to him and report it:

From: the email address listed in your PokerStars account
To: abuse@pokerstars.net
Subject: Chat abuse
-----
Player: "name"
Tourney: shown in title bar of window
When: date, time
Details: I played slow & methodical against a speed demon. He didn't like it and started dropping F-bombs and S-bombs, written to get around your content filter. Then he threatened to slash my throat.

Why are there so many bad beats?

Good or bad luck is just the instan­ta­neous mani­fes­ta­tion of statis­ti­cal pro­ba­bility.

(Look at this snapshot. Player "ashkh" flopped a flush with a gutshot to the king-high straight flush. The river completes her straight flush and only one card in the deck can beat her — the one that completes a royal flush. Imagine how that person must have felt. "I had a king-high straight flush but I lost to a one-outer royal flush on the river!")

So let's do a little math. Let's say six players invest 4xBB to see the flop. A suited T3 gets involved because it was suited, but he's even more happy to flop 33T. This is bound to happen at some point given the high volume of players who see every flop. And once you nail trips or a full house on the flop, there's roughly a 5% chance you'll go quad by the river!

Now let's say the 4xBB raiser has a suited AT. He's got two pair on the flop. He bets out strongly, the full house calls, and now our guy thinks "did this idiot pay 4xBB with a 3 kicker?" The turn brings another T. "Aha, now I'll screw that 3 into the ground," he thinks. Suited AT goes all in, suited T3 calls, and the river brings — you guessed it! — the case 3. Our guy screams about statistical improbabilities when in fact it's all about (1) the sheer number of players who see the flop and (2) the sheer number of hands that show down at the river.

If you play ultra-tight in the ULBPC events, you'll quickly discover you throw away a lot of amazing hands. I myself have thrown away three royal flushes before the flop, roughly two dozen straight flushes, countless quads, and countless other stone-cold-nuts hands. And those are just my hands! Again, it's all about the sheer number of hands that show down at the river. "If I'd called all in with those pocket 5s in the big blind on the first hand, I would've made quads and I'd have taken four players' stacks!"

Real-money games see fewer true "bad beats" because (a) fewer people see the flop and (b) even fewer hands get show down. Still, you'll see all sorts of amazing beats on television. You just need to bring enough cameras to a tournament with thousands of players... Heck, you can still give or take an amazingly bad beat with just the final three players, where you can nail quads on the river yet lose to a straight flush on the turn. This leads me to postulate Rosenberger's Proclivity For Bad Beats:

1. If you're destined to lose, let it be to quads; and
2. If you're destined to lose, let it be with quads!

Bad play breeds bad beats

A calling station is a loose player and a loose player will suck out proportionately more often. In other words, stupidity breeds bad beats. So on those occasions when I get sucked out, I say out loud "ah well, boo hoo" and then I find another school of fish. I know that good or bad luck is just the instan­ta­neous mani­fes­ta­tion of statis­ti­cal proba­bility.

An analysis of some crap shoots

• Four players go all in pre-flop and pocket aces lose to a middle suited connector. Pre-flop, rockets are only 58% to win and 78RPM trails at 19%; the KT and Q9 hold live cards but they interfere with each other's straight possibilities. After the flop, the suited connector jumps to 60% and rockets drop to 24%. After the turn, the suited connector rises to 80%, rockets drops to 20%, and the other two hands go bust.

• Four players go all in pre-flop and they all chop to a straight. Pre-flop, we see two players holding a queen, yet popeye only has a 29% chance versus 33% for the suited big chick. After the flop, popeye jumps to 53%, big chick plunges to 17%, and the suited J8 gains +1% with a pair and a backdoor flush draw. After the turn, popeye makes trips and jumps to 67%, big chick holds steady at 17% thanks to a flush draw, J8 plunges to 7% — and the royal marriage can only pray for a 7.5% chop.

• Two players go all in pre-flop and rockets defeat popeye. Pre-flop, rockets is 81% to win versus 19%. After the flop, popeye drops to 13% but gets a backdoor flush draw. After the turn, rockets makes trips but popeye jumps to 18% with a flush draw.

Video with (sardonic) commentary for a typical crap shoot

1. bugda is under the gun with Ah9c {Sklansky group #8, EV -0.07, 16% to win against six opponents}. He's staring at an ace, which is a very powerful card no matter what position you're in. So he limps.
2. mtmt92 is next with an unknown hand. He folds.
3. docdispatch is in middle position with QhJd {Sklansky group #5, EV +0.03, 19% to win against six opponents}. He's staring at two paint cards and the guy right before him has folded. So he raises 5xBB.
4. dvd23456 is next with 7h7d {Sklansky group #5, EV +0.13, 17% to win against six opponents}. He's staring at a middle pocket pair and the guy right before him has raised aggressively. So he doubles the raise to 9xBB.
5. Hanolan is next with Jh9h {Sklansky group #4, EV +0.03, 19% to win against six opponents}. He's staring at a gap-suited hand plus he's got position on the two raisers. So he calls.
6. cristo966 is next with an unknown hand. He folds.
7. mayuying is on the cutoff with an unknown hand. He folds.
8. slymmshaddi is on the button with an unknown hand. He's got position over the other six players who are still in the hand. That alone merits a call with any two cards for any reasonable price. And nine times the blind is a very reasonable price. So he calls.
9. Iceman2122 is in the small blind with an unknown hand. He's first to act from this point forward, but he doesn't want the rest of the table to think he's weak. So he tosses 170 chips into the pot to defend 10 chips.
10. bigdogpaul is in the big blind with Ts9s {Sklansky group #4, EV +0.01, 19% to win against six opponents}. He's staring at a suited connector, and WPT host Mike Sexton is always saying "that's the kind of hand you like to see flops with, Vince!" So he tosses 160 chips into the pot to defend 20 chips.
11. bugda has to make another decision with his Ah9c. He was willing to invest as much as 1/75^th of his stack to win 30 chips, but now he only has to invest a little over 1/10^th of his remaining stack to win a gigantic pot worth 2/3^rd of his original stack! Even an offsuit ace is worth those kind of odds. So he calls.
12. docdispatch has to make another decision with his QhJd. He's the original raiser, but now he's staring at a re-raise behind him — and five players called that re-raise, including both blinds and the original limper. What kind of hands could those other five players have that could call a raise and a re-raise to 9xBB? Could one of the four kings or even one of the four aces be out there in someone's hand? Well, anyway, the pot is giving him better than 10:1 to call. So he calls.

1. Iceman2122 is first to act with an unknown hand. He checks.
2. bigdogpaul is next to act with Ts9s {23% to win against six opponents with no other info available}. He's got top pair with an okay kicker. If anyone else has a ten in his hand, there are only six kickers that can beat him. Probably no one has pocket queens, kings, or aces, else they would have been heard from before the flop. The board is rainbow, so no one can dream of a flush at this point. But did someone get sneaky with pocket jacks? Did someone call with pocket 8s, pocket 2s, or maybe a suited J8? Or did someone get stupid and decide he really wanted to see the very first flop with an 82 offsuit? These things aren't unheard of. Our guy needs to see where he stands. So he bets 1/12^th of the pot. That should be enough to drive out any unmade hands, leaving only speculative hands like J9 suited or 97 offsuit or two overcards, and it's just enough bait to lure out a monster hand, if there is one. Everyone else will be wise enough to fold or re-raise all in, and then our guy will know where he stands.
3. bugda is next to act with Ah9c {7% to win against six opponents with no other info available}. He's got ace high — probably still the best hand right now — plus he's got a backdoor flush draw. A paltry 100-chip bet into a 1200-chip pot? If that guy wants to buy some information, then it's information he'll get! So he raises to 320, leaving himself exactly 1,000 chips. "Aggressive poker is winning poker," as Phil Gordon often says.
4. docdispatch is next to act with QhJd {20% to win against six opponents with no other info available}. He's staring at a gutshot straight draw, plus the two overcards might be good. The pot is laying him almost exactly the right odds to call this bet/raise! So he calls.
5. dvd23456 is next to act with 7h7d {9% to win against six opponents with no other info available}. Okay, there are two overcards, and yeah, there are six other players in the hand, so someone out there might actually have one of the six cards that can beat him. And hey, what if a 7 is coming on the turn or river? That's something to consider. The pot is already 2,000, it only costs 320 to call, and he'll still have 1,000 chips. So he calls.
6. Hanolan is next to act with Jh9h {30% to win against six opponents with no other info available}. Wow, he's got an open-ended straight draw, a backdoor flush draw, plus three connectors to a straight flush! He's getting an incredible 7:1 on pot odds, so he calls. "Sure, I could raise," he thinks, "but I really want those other three players to call behind me so I can get all of their chips."
7. slymmshaddi is next to act with an unknown hand. The pot is giving him 8:1, but he folds.
8. Iceman2122 has another decision with an unknown hand. He checked from the small blind, and the pot is giving him 8:1, but he folds.
9. bigdogpaul has another decision with Ts9s. The guy next to him re-raised, which is a concern, but three other players are obviously chasing something, and they all called. The next card could spell disaster if the monster next to him strikes, or if one of the three chasers hits his magical card. But he's still got top pair with an okay kicker, and he's getting a whopping 12:1 on pot odds, and he'll still have 1,000 chips left if the turn spells disaster. He clicked on the "call 220" box before the action came back around to him!

1. bigdogpaul is now first to act with Ts9s {71% to win based on what we know}. The four looks harmless, plus it killed anyone's hope for a backdoor flush. But if there's another 10 in someone's hand, there's a seventh kicker he can't beat. Did an idiot get this far with pocket 4s? Did someone with an unsuited 84 or even 42 stick around and make two pair? This turn card probably didn't improve anybody's hand, but our guy can't be too sure. He wants to see the river for a cheap price. So he checks.
2. bugda is next to act with Ah9c {8% to win based on what we know}. The guy to his right checked, so that re-raise obviously taught him a lesson and he now fears our guy. Good. The four looks harmless, but if anyone was stupid enough to call all those raises & re-raises with a 4 kicker, then he might actually be beat. He's still only got ace high and the pot is now huge. He wants to see the river for a cheap price. So he checks.
3. docdispatch is next to act with QhJd {8% to win based on what we know}. The four looks harmless, and he's still staring at a gutshot straight draw, plus his two overcards might be good. He wants to see the river for a cheap price. So he checks.
4. dvd23456 is next to act with 7h7d {drawing dead based on what we know}. The four looks harmless. Better still, no one seems to be betting like they have one of the six cards that can beat him. Obviously, then, the previous raises & re-raises were bluffers who've probably just got an ace or maybe a small pair. But is there an idiot out there with pocket 4s or maybe even a 42 offsuit who's just dying to make a check-raise? Hard to tell. Everyone else seems content to check this one down, and our guy doesn't need to get greedy on the first hand. So he checks.
5. Hanolan is next to act with Jh9h {13% to win based on what we know}. The four looks harmless, but darn it, that spade dashed his hopes for a flush. Still, he's got an open-ended straight draw. Everyone has checked, which means they're all just chasing something. It's time to build up a bigger pot. He bets 280, which gives 11:1 pot odds to those few who can do math.
6. bigdogpaul has another decision to make with Ts9s. Everyone else checked around to the last guy, who is now obviously just trying to buy a monster pot with a "phallus bet." It's obvious a pair of tens with a 9 kicker is the best hand right now, and no one is going to take this pot away from him. Our guy straps on some gonads and pushes all in.
7. bugda has another decision to make with Ah9c. He still only has ace-high, but it's clear these idiots are bluffing with king-high or worse. Even if one of them has an 8 kicker, either of his hole cards will beat it if he pairs. The pot is offering him 4:1 to call, and that's good enough when you've got ace-high on the turn against four opponents. He calls.
8. docdispatch has another decision to make with QhJd. He's still staring at that gutshot straight draw, plus his two overcards might be good. And he's getting over 5:1 on pot odds. So he calls.
9. dvd23456 has another decision to make with 7h7d. What's happening here? Everyone checks, then the guy to his left bets out, and suddenly the guy who checked first is all in, and now everyone behind him has gone all in as well! Could all of these people be that eager to hope for an ace or king on the river? Even if he's beat right now — say by pocket 4s or pocket 2s — the river could still bring a 7 that will crush everyone at the table. The pot is offering over 6:1, which is spectacular. So he calls.
10. Hanolan will make the final decision with his Jh9h. He's open-ended, which is fantastic, and even a jack on the river might win it for him. He only needs 6:1 to call and the pot is offering nearly 8:1 at this point! So he calls.

Did Mike really suffer a bad beat when he called a solid re-raise on the river?

Is this hand really a bad beat?

A recent hand from a real-cash game on the 10/30/06 episode of "Live at the Bike" demonstrates just how weak your monster hand really might be. On this hand, six players go to the flop with a straddled, unraised pot. "Mike" and "Alan" love to see flops with any two cards. Both players flop trip deuces. Mike bets out, Alan calls, and the other four players fold, including one player with a 5 in his hand.

Both players have a poor kicker — yet each player knows the other will bet/call with less than trip deuces! On the turn, Mike's kicker will almost certainly give him the win on the river, and he's picked up a redraw to the flush. Mike bets out again and Alan calls again. We know someone folded a 5, so Alan is drawing to a two-outer. Sure enough, Alan nails it on the river. Mike makes a simple value bet — and Alan pushes all in.

Yes: Alan nailed a two-outer on the river. But let's look at it from Mike's perspective. Alan smooth-calls him to the river and then suddenly re-raises all in. "Live at the Bike" co-host Bart Hanson made an important observation when he questioned Mike's hand based on the texture of the board!

• Mike knows Alan will limp a straddled pot with a deuce, so he plausibly has the case deuce. If Alan has it, then Mike loses to eight kickers! He only beats three kickers (3, 6, 7) and ties with one (9).
• Alan is known to limp with a middle pair when multiple players are already invested in a straddled pot. If Alan had pocket 8s, then he flopped a full house and smooth-called the flop & turn because he knows Mike will show aggression when he's out of position.
• Alan will sometimes even call a straddled raise with any low pair, and he oftens pays to see the turn without regard to the texture of the flop. If he limped in with pocket 4s, he made a full house on the turn and smooth-called because he knows Mike will show aggression when he's out of position.
• Repeat: Alan will sometimes even call a straddled raise with any low pair. If he limped with pocket 5s, then he's only facing one overcard. With two deuces on the board, Alan might believe it's somewhat unlikely that Mike has a deuce — and Mike didn't raise on the straddle, so he probably doesn't have a pair. The turn card is lower than a 5, which could easily convince Alan he might have the best hand. The river gives him a full house and he pushes all in.
• Repeat: Alan oftens pays to see the turn without regard to the texture of the flop. If he limped with any A3 or a suited 63, then the turn gives him a gutshot straight draw, and Mike knows Alan chases gutshots.
• Mike knows Alan will typically just call a river bet with trips, even with a big kicker. After all, there's a lot of plausible hands that A2 can't beat.

Mike faced five opponents on the flop and then faced a strong re-raise on the river. It's not that Alan sucked out — rather, it's that Mike couldn't beat the majority of Alan's plausible holdings. This happens all the time in ULBPC events!

Suckouts happen when four or more opponents go to the flop and two people get to the river. If a check-caller suddenly makes a strong re-raise on the river, you need to ask "what can I beat here?" If you can beat the majority of plausible holdings, then call. If you can't beat the majority of plausible holdings, then fold.

"But Rob!" you moan, "these ULBPC events reek of bluffs!" Yes. Some idiot might have gone to the river with any ace, thinking "I'm golden if I can pair it." And he might be sitting there facing your value bet, and he might be thinking "this guy is amazingly tight and is actually trying to win, so he just might fold a monster if I push all in!" And he might raise you all in on an outrageous bluff. It happens. A lot. If you can beat the majority of plausible holdings, then call. If you can't beat the majority of plausible holdings, then fold.

"But Rob!" you moan, "these people think a paired ace is the nuts!" Yes. A fish will call to the river with bottom pair or just ace-high, each time thinking "maybe I'll improve on the next card." And the river might give him something bizzare like "bottom three pair." And he might actually be thinking "hooray, I'm gonna double up!" And he might actually re-raise you with a bizarre holding you can easily beat. It happens. A lot. If you can beat the majority of plausible holdings, then call. If you can't beat the majority of plausible holdings, then fold.

Know this. Few players in the ULBPC events can identify the plausible holdings that would beat them on the river. You're almost certainly the best player at the table if you can do it. To paraphrase "Live at the Bike" co-host Dave Tuchman ... you've mastered the game of THNL when you can call with JACK-HIGH because you know your opponent's most plausible holding is SIX-HIGH!

YouTube video analysis #1 of poor play

Let's start with "Poker Lesson #1: Never let avatars push you around." He starts off by dismissing the players as "morons except for me." He then glances at some of the players' "weird" avatars before focusing on a rather innocuous "deuche bag" wearing a baseball hat whose face might put this guy on tilt later in the game. For reasons known only to "BuckLoX," he doesn't choose to block the avatar for "jdubb220."

"BuckLoX" picks up a suited 62 in the cutoff on the first hand. He calls it a worthy hand to play from the cutoff as a "flush draw." Sure enough, "jdubb220" raises under the gun to 9xBB, obeying the #3 scenario for the first two hands of an ULBPC event. "BuckLoX" makes a bad decision to re-raise to 20xBB. (But hey: let's give credit where due. If you're going to see a flop with a suited 62, you want to be in very late position and you definitely want to raise or re-raise with it. "BuckLoX" meets these criteria. It simply won't work during the first two hands of an ULBPC event.)

"BuckLoX" re-raises nearly 1/3 of his stack before the very first flop. Everyone else folds, giving him position, but his opponent will be heads-up if he calls — and if that guy's hand was worth raising 9xBB under the gun, then it's certainly worth calling twice that amount, out of position. "jdubb220" calls and "BuckLoX" utters in amazement when they go to the flop with 830 in the pot. He pairs his deuce and quickly calls a bet of 160, getting 6:1 in position to see the turn. The pot is now 1150. The turn brings a king and "BuckLoX" decides he'll use the card to his advantage, fully expecting his opponent to check. But "jdubb220" bets 560 so quickly that "BuckLoX" lingers his mouse over the call button for a moment before finally realizing his predicament. He then mutters "whatever" and folds, muttering the guy probably "got lucky" on the turn with something like an offsuit K7.

{Personally, I don't think K7 makes sense here unless it's suited spades. Sure, the person under the gun could have any two cards in the #3 scenario. But facing a queen on the flop, I'd say "jdubb220" is testing the waters with a suited ace that paired its kicker, or a middle pair from sixes to eights, or any spade draw — or he's trying to goad the re-raiser to push all in with a queen against his pocket kings or aces. We can see two deuces, so I can't put him on pocket deuces; and he didn't check, which leads me to dismiss pocket fives and pocket queens. The meek call on the flop from "BuckLoX" telegraphs the fact he doesn't have a queen, and "jdubb220" feels confident enough to make his opponent pay dearly on the turn. At this point I'd put him on big slick, a suited spade king, pocket aces, a spade draw with an inside straight draw, or perhaps kings-up.}

"BuckLoX" coincidentally picks up K7 on the second hand of the game. "This is actually a pretty good hand: king high with a seven kicker," he declares, just ten seconds after he'd brushed off "jdubb220" for getting "lucky" with the same hand. He also ignores the fact his K7 faces eight other players at the table with four players behind him. Indeed, "BuckLoX" decides his hand is powerful enough to bust "jdubb220" because, "like I said, I don't like that guy right now." Already facing three limpers, he raises to 9xBB and reminds us that he has position — only to retract the claim when the button calls his raise. "jdubb220" wisely sacrifices his big blind, leaving "BuckLoX" to duke it out with the rest of the table. The three limpers fold and "BuckLoX" goes heads-up out of position. The flop brings a king and "BuckLoX" pushes all in, hoping the guy will call with a backdoor diamond draw or a straight draw. (He fails to mention an obvious spade draw on the board.) The button folds and he congratulates himself for "scaring" his opponent out of the pot.

"BuckLoX" picks up 94 in late-middle position. He's the third to limp. The button limps in fourth and "jdubb220" raises to 6xBB from the SB. "BuckLoX" utters disbelief and decides to call. The other limpers fold and these two again go heads-up. The pot is 360 and the flop brings a 9-high rainbow. "jdubb220" check-folds when "BuckLoX" bets 480 (roughly half his remaining stack). He then tells us he likes 94 over A9 on that flop because the 4 gives him "straight possibilities."

"BuckLoX" has recovered to a healthy stack of 1430 chips and he picks up Q6 in middle position. He folds without thinking, then mutters "I don't know why I folded a queen there. I wasn't paying attention! Jesus! Look at all these morons. So, they all know I folded, so this next hand I'm gonna push all in." He then gets into an argument with "jdubb220" over why he called the previous hand with an offsuit 94. "BuckLoX" chides the guy for for playing K7 in their previous heads-up. After the argument, he restates his intention to go all in on the next hand "no matter what cards I have." He then makes an amazing statement: "I prefer lower hands because everyone knows that winning with lower cards is much better than winning with higher cards. I mean, it just feels better."

One player has just busted out and "BuckLoX" picks up A2 under the gun with seven opponents. He pushes all in and then admits "I'm not gonna be surprised if I get called by AA or QQ." One player calls for his remaining 1350 with pocket nines and "jdubb220" overcalls them both with a suited AJ. "BuckLoX" sighs with disbelief. The board brings two pair. Pocket nines triples up and the ace-holders tie.

"BuckLoX" utters an amazing statement: "I had an ace, I was the favorite, except for that moron had an ace [as well]." In reality, pocket nines was the favorite with 51.1%, followed by "jdubb220" at 36.8%, with "BuckLoX" trailing at 8.7%. They stood a 3.1% chance for a two-way ace chop and a 0.34% chance for a three-way chop. "BuckLoX" got lucky in the sense that his kicker didn't play.

"jdubb220" is crippled with less than 200 chips. "BuckLoX" is down to 80 chips and confidently declares "I still have some chips." He picks up 53 in the big blind, which consumes 1/4 of his stack. It's typical in an ULBPC event to see limpers come in against multiple crippled stacks and, as expected, two limpers come in. The small blind raises 4xBB, which would put "BuckLoX" all in. He's convinced the SB has a pocket pair, but he rationalizes he'll push all in anyway because he has "straight possibilities."

{If you realize you're in the big blind with only 3xBB left to your name, and if you recognize the fact two people limped, and if the SB actually dares to raise you all in ... you can call with any two cards and just pray one of the limpers will fold.}

So "BuckLoX" pushes all in with his offsuit 53 because of its "straight possibilities." Five cards hit the felt and he temporarily misreads the board, thinking he made a straight. The small blind turns over a suited T9 and wins the pot. "BuckLoX" busts out in eighth place.

"BuckLoX" tries to issue one final insult to "jdubb220," but PokerStars doesn't let players talk to the table after they bust out. He finishes the video by saying "Well, I guess that's gonna do it for my tournament. Hopefully next time A2 holds up for once. I mean, you hear about this badness on the forums of all your poker sites, and you just witnessed it. I mean, eighth place: that sucks! All right, I'm gonna go {'find'?} some more noobs..."